South Sudan’s neighbours: competing interests and regional cooperation

Start with functions, not labels

The phrase ‘the international community’ can obscure more than it explains. For South Sudan, different partners can be important to oil exports, movement of goods, humanitarian access, political talks or investment. Even one government may pursue several of those objectives through institutions that do not always act together. An analysis of regional influence should begin with the function of each relationship.

Two public frameworks illustrate the distinction. East African Community integration is organised around economic and political cooperation, including a customs union and common market.^[1] IGAD’s March 2025 extraordinary summit on South Sudan addressed ceasefire obligations, political dialogue and implementation of the peace agreement.^[2] Membership and participation connect these agendas, but do not make their tools interchangeable.

An import delayed at a border may require a customs procedure to change. An armed confrontation may require a security commitment to be monitored. A dispute over political participation may require a negotiated bargain. Asking a single regional summit to solve all three can produce agreement in language without clarity in execution.

Map the relationship before judging it

A useful map has four questions for each issue: what does South Sudan need; what can the counterpart actually provide; what does that counterpart seek; and who bears the cost if cooperation fails? The answers should be based on agreements, trade evidence and observable decisions. They should not be inferred from a leader’s personal rapport or assumed ethnic affinities.

In the relationship with Sudan, the oil-export connection is a material constraint. The pipeline disruption documented in the World Bank’s economic overview shows why infrastructure outside South Sudan affects its budget.^[3] That does not tell us every party’s negotiating position. It does establish that a purely domestic account of revenue instability is incomplete.

For relations with East African partners, customs coordination provides a concrete example of cooperation that can be evaluated. The Single Customs Territory framework provides for destination-country assessment while goods are still at the first entry point.^[4] Whether a given trader experiences those intended efficiencies must be measured locally; regional institutional design is not proof of implementation at every crossing.

Kenya’s diplomatic role is another distinct function. The March 2025 IGAD communiqué recognises the Kenya-led Tumaini initiative and calls for renewed talks.^[2] This supports describing an official mediation role at that time. It does not establish either neutrality in every dispute or the success of the initiative.

Where interests can overlap

Predictable movement of lawful goods, reduced violence near borders and reliable communication during emergencies are plausible areas of shared benefit. The advantage of such practical agreements is that they can continue to serve both sides even when wider political relations become strained. This is a proposition about incentives, not a claim that agreement is already secured.

Consider a bilateral arrangement for resolving customs complaints. It could specify recognised documentation, the office responsible for disputed charges and a time limit for response. Traders would have a reference against which to assess conduct. Officials would have a channel for correcting errors before every incident became a diplomatic confrontation.

Security cooperation needs a different accountability structure. A cross-border arrangement may reduce one danger while creating another if its scope, civilian protections or review mechanisms are unclear. The relevant question is not simply whether two governments cooperate, but what the cooperation authorises and how affected communities can seek redress.

The objection: practical agreements are too small

The strongest objection is that technical coordination cannot overcome fundamental political mistrust. A customs protocol will not hold if a government decides that disruption serves a larger strategic objective. Likewise, a committee cannot compel actors that believe coercion is cheaper than compromise.

That limitation is real. Practical agreements work best where the underlying interests overlap; they cannot manufacture agreement on every security question. Their value is more modest: they preserve channels, reduce avoidable uncertainty and reveal where commitments are being honoured. A narrow agreement with evidence of implementation may be more useful than an expansive promise without a responsible agency.

South Sudan should also avoid treating diversification of partners as a numerical exercise. More bilateral announcements do not necessarily create more room to act. If every arrangement depends on the same revenue stream or one indispensable route, apparent diplomatic breadth can coexist with concentrated exposure.

An agenda readers can test

The first research task is a public inventory of the agreements that govern major cross-border functions, recording their dates, implementation bodies and known information gaps. The next is to track a small number of outcomes: transit delays, resolution of commercial complaints, continuity of key routes and implementation of specific diplomatic undertakings.

Claims about a neighbour’s intention should remain hypotheses unless supported by evidence. If trade continues during political disagreement, that is relevant. If a regional commitment is repeatedly bypassed, that is relevant too. This approach makes regional analysis useful without pretending that geography fixes anyone’s behaviour or that South Sudan has no choices of its own.